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Abstract
Many economists and politicians argue that monetary and
fiscal policies have to be coordinated internationally; in
their opinion, this is the only way to solve economic prob-
lems in a highly integrated world. In recent years, the
proponents have applied the game-theoretic approach to make
the case stronger: If one country only pursues its own
interest, this policy will have effects on foreign economies
which will in turn react towards these changes. Such a pro-
cess leads to a deterioration of the situation in all coun-
tries; therefore there is an incentive to coordinate.
It is shown in this paper that the actual situation in the
world economy is not as gloomy as suggested by the game-
theoretic approach. In particular, the assumption about the
behavior of policymakers seems to be unrealistic: They
usually do not stick to their original targets after a
global shock, and they do not totally ignore the effects of
their policy actions on other countries. Apart from this,
the costs of coordination are usually neglected or played
down: Firstly, the private sector is normally left out of
the game. Secondly, since knowledge about the relationships
in the world economy is limited and since politicians do not
agree on the model, coordination can be counterproductive
even if all participants agree on the package. And finally,
governments and central banks tend to form a cartel at the
expense of voters and taxpayers.
There are hardly any success stories of coordination. The
locomotive-stratey of the seventies, usually advanced by
proponents as the example for good coordination, led to a
new round of inflation and the recession of the early
eighties. And exchange rate arrangements either were not
very successful - like the EMS, where inflation did decline
but by less than in the rest of the OECD - or were not
sustainable, like the Louvre-accord of February 1987.
An alternative concept is a system in which governments and
central banks precommit themselves to specific rules for
policy. Coordination in such a system means that the au-
thorities inform each other about their intentions and avoid
strategies which are against the interests of the other
countries - like beggar-thy-neighbor policies. In such a
system, each country is free to choose the path which it
feels is adequate for achieving the domestic targets. If
this leads to more competition among countries, all coun-
tries can benefit because the authorities can learn from
their own mistakes and from good or bad examples of other
countries.- 2 -
HOW STRONG IS THE CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION?*
I. International Coordination of Economic Policies: In What
Form and in Which Areas?
There seems to be a consensus among politicians and eco-
nomists that economic problems such as high unemployment and
inflation can only be solved if economic policies are coor-
dinated on an international scale. The 1987 economic summit
at Venice viewed international coordination as essential "to
achieving stronger and sustained global growth, reduced
external imbalances and more stable exchange rate relation-
ships" (1) . In a similar vein, Helmut Schmidt argued in 1983
that "the major industrial countries' policy mix must be
coordinated" (Schmidt, 1983, p. 24). The EC-Commission
(1986) as well as the OECD (1987a) have recently urged poli-
cymakers to implement a cooperative policy action to restore
satisfactory macroeconomic performance of the major indus-
trial countries. These calls for more international coordi-
nation receive their theoretical underpinnings from the work
of a number of economists who argue that by coordinating
their policies individual countries can avoid negative
spillover effects of uncoordinated sovereign policymaking
and take advantage of positive spillover effects. Coordina-
tion would allow each country to achieve its economic tar-
gets to a greater degree than if it pursued an independent
policy stance (2) .
Since the term "international economic policy coordination"
may have different meanings it seems useful to define our
* Based on the Kiel Discussion Paper No. 135, Internatio-
nale Koordination der Wirtschaftspolitik: Pro und Con-
tra. Kiel, November 1987.
(1) Venice Economic Declaration, Paragraph 3.
(2) The main proponents of this view are Richard N. Cooper,
Koichi Hamada, Matthew Canzoneri, Gilles Oudiz and
Jeffrey Sachs. Cooper (1985a) provides a useful summary.- 3 -
terms from the outset. We distinguish different forms of
coordination (Putnam, Bayne, 1984; Cooper, 1986, p. 5):
(i) Exchange of information on the current and future
stance of economic policy to provide a basis for the
formulation of economic policies in other countries.
(ii) Agreement on individual policy targets to avoid the
pursuit of futile targets.
(iii) Coordinated use of economic policy instruments to
achieve agreed values of macroeconomic targets.
The demands for giving up national autonomy become increas-
ingly greater as countries move from (i) to (iii) (1). It is
not surprising that historic examples for the different
forms of policy coordination become increasingly rare as
they impinge more and more on national sovereignty (2).
As far as the areas of international coordination are con-
cerned, there is a consensus among most economists that
international public goods are best provided by coordinated
measures of all the governments involved. Examples of such
international public goods are an international legal order
and the worldwide reduction of trade barriers. There is
considerably less consensus on whether the international
(1) These forms of policy coordination pertain to the con-
tinued use of policy instruments to achieve certain
targets (fine tuning). Coordination may also be used to
establish a trade or exchange rate regime, a subject not
dealt with here.
(2) The most frequently cited instance of a successful ex-
ample for type (iii)-policy coordination are the meas-
ures decided upon at the Bonn summit of 1978 (Frenkel,
1987, p. 208); Cooper (1985b, p. 370). The Bonn summit
is not, however, without critics: "...the expansionary
measures decided upon at Bonn were soon revised, and the
Bonn summit is widely considered to be an example of the
pitfalls of international 'fine-tuning'" (Home, Masson,
1987, p. 30). Vaubel (1985, p. 235) asserts that the
fiscal stimulus that was the German government's con-
tribution to the policy package was "ill-timed , from a
cyclical point of view and contributed to the severe
budgetary problems of the early eighties".- 4 -
coordination of monetary and fiscal policies should be used
to and can in fact achieve the common targets of high em-
ployment, stability of the price level and the exchange
rate, and a reduction of current account "imbalances". In
order to judge the merits and demerits of international
policy coordination, at least four questions have to be
addressed:
- On what theoretical grounds can a case be established in
favor of explicitly coordinating the economic policies of
different countries?
- What are important prerequisites for successful inter-
national policy coordination?
- What can we learn from past attempts to coordinate poli-
cies?
- What alternatives to explicit policy coordination exist?
II. The Game-Theoretic Case for Policy Coordination
One of the cornerstones on which the case for international
policy coordination rests is Franco Modigliani's famous ob-
servation that "a private enterprise economy using an in-
tangible money needs to be stabilized, can be stabilized and
therefore should be stabilized" (Modigliani, 1977, p. 1).
Proponents of international policy coordination firmly
adhere to Modigliani's credo; it is not surprising that
monetarist or new-classical economists either ignore the
debate on policy coordination or are highly critical of such
proposals (1). The other cornerstone on which the case for
(1) Cf. Friedman's (1964, p. 8) early warning: "In recent
years, the concern with the international balance of
payments has given rise to greater co-operation among
central banks... I must confess that I regard the ten-
dency as an exceedingly dangerous one". More recently,
an outspoken critic of international policy coordination
has been Vaubel (1980, 1983, 1985).- 5 -
international policy coordination rests denies Modigliani's
second hypothesis on stabilization policies: In interdepend-
ent countries where the actions of one policymaker impinge
upon the targets of other policymakers, sovereign policy
making by itself cannot stabilize the economy. In fact,
attempts to do so will lead to a situation that is worse
than the situation that would have prevailed if there had
been no attempts to stabilize the economy. But all is not
lost for the cause of fine tuning: the solution to the
problem lies in the international coordination of national
policies. Via the route of international fine tuning,
Modigliani's second hypothesis is vindicated. The task of
proponents of international policy coordination is therefore
two-fold:
- demonstrate that sovereign policymaking is suboptimal and
- show that international policy coordination can improve
upon sovereign policymaking.
The analytical demonstration that sovereign policymaking is
suboptimal is by now familiar; we will therefore restrict
ourselves to a verbal presentation of its main assumptions
and results (1) . At the outset the well-known point is made
that macroeconomic policy measures are transmitted to other
countries thereby affecting their macroeconomic performance.
Various channels for these spillover effects have been con-
sidered in the literature (2) , among them are real exchange
rate changes and changes in income which affect internation-
al trade flows. The fact that domestic macroeconomic vari-
ables such as output and inflation are affected by policy
decisions abroad establishes a strategic interdependence
among policymakers which can be analyzed using the tools of
game theory. Three basic assumptions are made in order to
arrive at the suboptimality of sovereign policymaking:
(1) Cf. Cooper (1985a, pp. 1213-1217) for a useful introduc-
tion to the analytical framework. He also provides a
survey of the literature.
(2) Cf. Canzoneri, Gray (1985, pp. 525 f.).- 6 -
(i) The best course of action for domestic policymakers
depends on the policy choices made abroad. It is as-
sumed that policymakers behave myopically when opti-
mizing their response to foreign policy disturbances:
they ignore possible measures of their counterparts
caused by their own decisions. This assumption is
familiar from models of firms
1 behavior in oligopoly
theory.
(ii) There is a scarcity of policy instruments and there-
fore policymakers have to trade off different targets
when deciding on the use of their policy instruments.
Analytically such trade-offs are modelled using utili-
ty functions of policymakers (1). Optimality then
requires that policy instruments are employed until
policymakers are indifferent between, for example, a
further decline in unemployment and a further rise in
inflation (2).
(iii) Uncoordinated attempts at fine tuning are initiated by
a global shock that affects all countries alike (3).
In the absence of corrective policy measures, a nega-
tive supply shock would leave output below and infla-
tion above their target values. Policymakers in each
country therefore attempt to reattain the output and
inflation levels they had desired before the shock
occurred. An alternative that is not considered would
be an adjustment of targets to levels that are more
appropriate to worldwide economic conditions after the
shock has occurred.
(1) Oudiz, Sachs (1984, pp. 37 f.) attempt to quantify (or
reveal) the preferences of policymakers. Their analy-
tical framework is rejected in Martinez-Oliva (1987) .
(2) Not surprisingly, all models imply a positive trade-off
between output and inflation.
(3) Cf. Canzoneri, Gray (1985, p. 549): "By assumption, all
games are initiated by a global shock that will, in the
absence of corrective policy, cause output levels in
both countries to deviate from their full employment
values".- 7 -
Given these assumptions, it can be shown that individually
rational behavior of each policy-maker leads to a globally
suboptimal situation, a result that is demonstrated using
two scenarios.
In scenario 1 it is assumed that foreign expansionary policy
is transmitted positively to the home country, causing a
rise in output. This scenario has also been called "locomo-
tive world" (1) . The suboptimality arises in this scenario
because uncoordinated policy measures to combat the negative
output effects of the external shock do not go far enough.
Individual optimizing leads to expansionary measures until
the marginal utility gain from a further increase in employ-
ment is just matched by the marginal utility loss from a
further increase in inflation. From a global point of view,
however, welfare would increase at this point if the home
country undertook further expansionary measures because
output abroad would rise. Since these positive spillover
effects do not enter the welfare calculations of policy-
makers, additional expansionary measures are not under-
taken (2) . Since every policymaker behaves in this way, a
contractionary (less expansionary) bias characterizes eco-
nomic policies throughout the world. Scenario l^is occasion-
ally said to characterize the period after the rise in oil
prices at the end of the seventies. It is claimed that the
worldwide recession in the wake of the second oil price rise
would have been less severe if countries had coordinated
their macroeconomic policies.
(1) By Canzoneri, Gray (1985). The analysis in Dreze et al.
(1987) is based on scenario 1.
(2) Canzoneri, Gray (1985, p. 560): "While both players
respond to an oil price increase by increasing their
money growth rates, they do not increase them enough".
The reason why countries prefer not to contribute to
further increases in monetary growth is similar to the
incentive problems of the provision of public goods: it
is optimal for everyone to speculate on a free ride on
the locomotive of expansionary policy abroad.- 8 -
A "beggar-thy-neighbor" world is depicted in scenario 2. In
this case policy measures cause negative spillovers in the
other country. Usually it is assumed that policymakers try
to "import" price stability via a real appreciation of their
currency caused by a monetary policy that is more restric-
tive than abroad (1). If all policymakers act in this
manner, they can never for long achieve their aim because of
the reaction from abroad that they myopically fail to take
into consideration. Thus the wish of every policymaker to
"import" price stability results in a dynamic adjustment
process familiar from duopoly theory as the zig-zag movement
between two reaction functions. As policymakers continue to
react to disturbances from abroad, their policy stance be-
comes progressively more restrictive. It is only at the
intersection of the reaction functions of both policymakers
that this process ceases. The equilibrium thus attained is
usually referred to as a non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium.
It is characterized by the fact that both countries choose
the same (low) rate of monetary expansion with the exchange
rate remaining constant and the inflation target abroad no
longer affected by domestic monetary policy. The non-co-
operative Nash-equilibrium is suboptimal from a global point
of view: since monetary policy is more restrictive than
originally planned, unemployment is needlessly high. Empiri-
cally scenario 2 is said to characterize worldwide economic
policies in the early eighties, when monetary policies in
Western Europe were quite restrictive in order to avoid an
even greater depreciation of their currencies against the
dollar.
Having demonstrated that uncoordinated attempts at fine
tuning lead to global inefficiencies, it is fairly straight-
forward to demonstrate that international policy coordina-
tion leads to an improvement. Whereas under a system of
(1) The analyses of Cooper (1985a, pp. 1214-1218) and Oudiz,
Sachs (1984, p. 50 ff.) are based on scenario 2.- 9 -
competitive policies "spillover effects" were ignored in
each policymaker's welfare calculus, they are now taken into
consideration. By explicitly trading expansionary measures
in scenario 1, the coordinating countries remove the "checks
and balances" that the international monetary regime imposes
upon a country that seeks to expand on its own, i.e. a de-
valuation of the currency or a loss in reserves. Indeed as
most models assume that inflation is only caused by a rise
in the price of imported goods, there is no theoretical
limit as to how far countries could jointly expand their
money supplies as long as they do so at the same rate (1) .
In scenario 2 coordination consists of the mutual commitment
to refrain from competitive beggar-thy-neighbor policies, be
they aimed at "importing" employment - the classic worry of
Keynesian authors - or price stability, their more recent
concern. In both cases coordination leads to a Pareto im-
provement: every country is at least as well off in a coor-
dinated regime, some even better (2). A comparison of the
coordinated policy measures in both scenarios shows that
coordination may either consist of the joint decision to
embark upon fine tuning (scenario 1) or the agreement to
refrain from doing so in an uncoordinated way (scenario 2).
(1) Most elementary models on international policy coordina-
tion assume that countries are identical in every
aspect. In this special case coordination always results
in identical measures. Once more complicated models with
asymmetries are used, coordination may imply different
policy stances in different countries. Thus it is not
generally true that policy coordination implies a syn-
chronization of policies in one direction.
(2) Therefore every country has an incentive to participate
in policy coordination. Oudiz, Sachs (1984, p. 3 f.)
note that this demonstration is an improvement to
earlier empirical exercises which merely demonstrated
that a coordinated expansion had a greater impact on
worldwide output than an uncoordinated expansion. It had
to be assumed that some countries act altruistically for
this result to hold. Cf. also Vaubel (forthcoming).- 10 -
III. A Critique of the Game-Theoretic Approach
Supporters of international policy coordination who base
their arguments on the game-theoretic approach may wonder at
the stupidity of politicians who do not seize this oppor-
tunity for welfare gains. Is the widespread absence of co-
ordinated macropolicies a sign of "policy failure" on an
international scale or might there be reasons that explain
why the prescription of the game-theoretic approach does not
lend itself to an application in the real world? We proceed
in two steps. At first the question is addressed whether the
game-theoretic characterization of an uncoordinated or com-
petitive international economic system fits the present
situation in the world economy. Our main conclusion is that
characterizing present worldwide relations among policy-
makers as a non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium is unduely
pessimistic. If we are in fact not in as bad a situation as
proponents of international policy making would like to make
us believe, a close look at the actual working of inter-
national coordination seems called for. This is our second
step where we focus on possible costs of international poli-
cy coordination;'
1. Are Policymakers Myopic and Adamant?
Whether policy coordination can in fact lead to welfare
gains depends on initial conditions. Proponents of policy
coordination claim that the present international "non-sys-
tem" is inefficient; in this paragraph we question their
assumptions about the behavior of policymakers.
One of the crucial assumptions says that policymakers do not
adjust their macroeconomic targets in the face of adverse
external shocks. In fact the discrepancy between the desired
value and the realized value of the policy target initiates
all games which do not stop until this gap has disappeared.- 11 -
Why would it be more realistic to assume that politicians
adjust their targets to more reasonable values in the face
of adverse developments?
An adverse external shock carries the simple message for
domestic policymakers that their range of attainable targets
has become smaller. The result of attempts to deny this are
nicely summarized by a Swedish policymaker: "We attempted to
build a bridge but ended up with a pier" (1) . If policy-
makers adjusted their targets instead of trying to build
bridges, policy coordination would become superfluous be-
cause there would no longer be any need for policy measures,
be they coordinated or not (2) .
It is well-known from duopoly theory that the behavioral
assumptions underlying a non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium
are highly unrealistic: "It models the behaviour not of
rational economic agents but of imbeciles. They learn noth-
ing, clinging inspite of over-whelming counter-evidence to
zero reactions" (Bacharach, 1977, p. 71). Current inter-
national policy making - while not presenting the textbook
case of the coordinated use of policy instruments - does not
seem to be conducted by politicians who myopically fail to
take into account the reaction of the other countries to
their own decisions. One quote may suffice to demonstrate
this: "The coordination process ... is an ongoing process
involving regular consultations among the participants on
their economic objectives and projections, current policies
and performance, and the possible need for remedial action"
(Mulford, 1987, p. 9). As a consequence we most probably are
not in a non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium and the potential
(1) Reported by Oudiz, Sachs (1984, p. 3).
(2) Cf. Martinez-Oliva, Sinn (1987) . The conclusion does not
change if, instead of building a bridge single-handedly
(uncoordinated policies), one tries to do so with! the
help of others (policy coordination). As will become
clear in the course of this essay, the latter amounts to
trying to build a bridge and ending up with two piers.- 12 -
gains from coordination are not as considerable as implied
by the game-theoretic approach.
The game-theoretic approach further assumes that in each
country there is a scarcity of instruments relative to tar-
gets. One reason is that policymakers are assumed to try to
achieve not only domestic but also external targets such as
a particular balance on the current account or a particular
exchange rate. At first sight coordination seems indeed to
be necessary for such targets to avoid conflicts - after
all, not every country can have a current account surplus,
and between any two countries there can only be one exchange
rate. Yet one may wonder whether current account balances
are meaningful targets of economic policy at all. Two con-
jectures are often brought forward in discussions about
external account balances. First, there seems to be a ten-
dency in international fora to associate a current account
balance of zero with an equilibrium, positive or negative
current account balances are often referred to as imbalan-
ces (1) . Second, surpluses carry the odium of beggar-thy-
neighbor-policies: Germany's and Japan's surpluses are said
to lead to an import of employment while the deficit coun-
tries deplore a loss of employment. Both conjectures are
wrong (2). Any deficit on the trade account is financed by a
surplus on the capital account. As long as the foreign in-
vestor earns a good return by investing abroad, there is no
reason why the deficit could not continue. Imbalances in the
sense of unsustainable situations need not occur (3). The
same is true for a trade account surplus, although there the
(1) The EC (1986) as well as the OECD (1987a, p. IX f.)
refer to the presently observed balances as disequi-
libria. Countries with a deficit are urged to curb
spending, those with a surplus should stimulate domestic
spending.
(2) And one may wonder why economists have not stressed this
point more.
(3) Cf. Samuelson (1972, p. 661): "Thus, there is no neces-
sary reason why a country should ever be paid off for
its past lending, unless it has become relatively
poorer". The same point is made by Gale (1974).Bibliothek
desinstitutsfurWeltwirtschaft - 13 -
stability is rarely questioned. The second conjecture con-
cerns the employment effects of trade account balances. No
new jobs are created by the presence of a trade account
surplus alone. On the contrary, the concomitant capital
export increases employment abroad, in the recipient coun-
try. The employment experience of the U.S. in the first half
of the 1980's as a major recipient of capital compared with
that of major capital exporting countries supports this
view. The balance on the external account of a country is
devoid of any normative implications: its size and its sign
cannot be associated with the welfare of a country in the
same way as, for example, a stable consumer price index or
steady economic growth. The same can be said for the ex-
change rate: just like any other relative price it serves as
an indicator of relative scarcities and cannot be a meaning-
ful target of economic policy.
The implications for international policy coordination are
substantial: if exchange rates and external accounts balan-
ces cease to serve as targets for economic policy, there may
no longer be a scarcity of instruments to attain the targets
of policymakers. Instead of searching for new instru-
ments (1), an equality of the number of targets and instru-
ments can also be achieved by making external targets re-
dundant (2) . This conclusion will not be accepted by those
who view the targets of policymakers as sacrosanct and argue
that the de facto pursuit of external targets by politicians
requires the economist to calculate how these targets can be
reached by implementing an internationally coordinated poli-
cy package. The package (and the economist's calculations)
become superfluous if governments were urged to renounce to
all their external targets. However, such a disinterested-
(1) Cf. Cooper (1985, p. 1230 f.).
(2) Oudiz (1985, p. II) describes the scarcity of policy
instruments in Europe. Since governments' policies con-
centrate on fighting inflation and correcting current
account imbalances, no instrument is left for curing
unemployment.- 14 -
ness on behalf of the economic profession is currently lack-
ing.
Is the present international monetary system as inefficient
as has been claimed and does it therefore warrant a coordi-
nated effort of economic policies to restore growth and
employment? A closer look at present international economic
arrangements has shown that they are in fact neither charac-
terized by the inefficient non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium
nor by a continuous effort at coordination. The true de-
scription would probably be that of a system where occasion-
al coordination of economic policy is taking place, mainly
in the realm of exchange rate stabilization. In all other
areas it is still true what Max Corden observed some years
ago: "The current laissez-faire international monetary sys-
tem is simply a market system which coordinates the decen-
tralized decisions reached by private and public actors and
is likely to be as efficient in this as the market system is
within the domestic economy" (Corden, 1983, p. 71). As a
result, the likely gains from coordination are going to be
small or zero. As a consequence, possible costs and effi-
ciency losses due to international coordination become more
important.
2. Efficiency Losses Due to International Policy Coordina-
tion
In many studies international coordination of policies is
presented as a panacea to important worldwide economic
problems. It is invoked time and again as an unexamined
alternative: the proof that existing arrangements are de-
ficient in one aspect or the other is a necessary and suf-
ficient condition to justify the call for coordination. What
such Nirvana economics (Demsetz, 1969) fails to take into
consideration is that policy coordination itself may fail,
primarily for two reasons:- 15 -
- policymakers' lack of knowledge about the structure of
their economics may prevent an implementation of the opti-
mal plan;
- the coordination process changes the incentives for third
parties in such a way that their reaction may militate
against the success of the coordination package.
The gains from coordination can only be realized if policy-
makers agree on and know the structure of the world economy
and the size of the "spillover effects" of their own policy
measures (1) . At present these prerequisites for successful
policy coordination are certainly not met. Table 1 reports
the results of a simulation exercise where different econo-
metric models were used to predict the effect of an expan-
sion of U.S. government spending on output and inflation in
the United States and the rest of the OECD-countries as well
as on the dollar exchange rate. While there is some agree-
Table 1 - Simulation Effect of an Increase in Government Expenditure in





















































































year of increase in government expenditure by
Positive sign: effective appreciation of the
Source: Frankel, Rockett (1986).
(1) Cf. Vaubel, 1985, p. 237.- 16 -
ment on the sign of the impact multipliers, there is little
agreement on the size of the effect.
Although policymakers are uncertain about the true model of
the world and therefore disagree, they will still be able to
coordinate policies on the basis of their divergent views as
long as each of them believes that the agreed upon measures
make his country better off. It is not certain, however,
that the agreed upon policy package does indeed lead to a
Pareto improvement. This is the main point of a recent paper
by Frankel and Rockett (1986) . They assume that the true
model of the world is not known to the policymakers, how-
ever, each one of them believes his model to be correct.
Agreement on a coordinated policy package will only be
reached if each policymaker believes the package will make
his country better off in terms of the macroeconomic targets
he pursues. Once policymakers have decided on a coordinated
policy package on the basis of their beliefs about the work-
ings of the economy, the effects of these measures can be
simulated using the "true" model. Frankel and Rockett repeat
this exercise with eight different models, in each round of
the simulation exercise another model is the "true" one. The
upshot of Frankel and Rockett
1s study is that in 206 out of
512 possible cases U.S. welfare is reduced by coordination
in comparison to the initial, uncoordinated situation, in
289 cases welfare improves. For the remaining OECD countries
welfare is improved by coordination in 297 cases, in 198
cases it is reduced.
Frankel and Rockett
1s results can be illustrated by one of
the basic scenarios of international policy coordination: a
joint monetary expansion. If politicians believe that by
coordinating their expansionary monetary policies they can
avoid inflation - because there will be no real deprecia-
tion - and raise output, they will engage in the coordina-
tion effort. If, however, the true model of the economy is
one where monetary expansion - whether coordinated or not -
leads to inflation and where employment gains are only small- 17 -
and transitory, the coordination effort will make all par-
ticipants worjie off.
Another reason why international policy coordination may be
counterproductive is that it creates adverse incentives for
those players that are left out of the coordination game.
Rogoff (1985) considers the credibility problem of central
banks vis-a-vis the private sector. He notes that inter-
national policy coordination lowers the incentive for the
central bank to prevent inflation. In a system of uncoordi-
nated monetary policies the announcement of the central bank
not to yield to private sector pressure to accommodate high
nominal wage increases by increasing the money supply is
credible because if the central bank were to do so, the
country would have to undergo an undesirable real deprecia-
tion of its exchange rate. But the same announcement is less
credible in a system where monetary policies are coordinated
because the threat of a real depreciation is not present.
This in turn will fuel inflationary expectations, raise
nominal wages and lead to actual higher inflation if the
central bank accommodates the rise in wages (1).
Rogoff's argument may be illustrated with the help of Table
2, which depicts expectations and actual policy in matrix
form to derive implications for the achievement of macroeco-
nomic targets. If monetary policy is not coordinated, in-
flationary expectations are low because the central bank is
expected to avoid a depreciation of the currency. The proba-
bility of inflation rises in a coordinated regime, therefore
inflationary expectations are high and higher wages are set.
Rogoff demonstrates that in a coordinated regime the proba-
bility of missing one's macroeconomic targets rises. If in a
coordinated regime the central bank pursues - contrary to
expectations - a stable monetary policy, there is an unex-
(1) "A regime in which governments conduct monetary policy
independently may produce lower time-consistent infla-
tion rates than a regime in which central banks coope-
rate; intergovernmental cooperation can exacerbate the
central banks' credibility problems vis-a-vis the pri-
vate sector" (Rogoff, 1985, p. 211).- 18 -
pected rise in real wages leading to unemployment (case
2) (1). If, on the other hand, expectations of a loose mone-
tary policy are fulfilled and the central bank does indeed
accommodate the steep wage increases, it will cause infla-
tion (case 4). Only in case 1 are both targets, price level
stability and full employment, actually met. In this case
inflationary expectations are low and the central bank does
not attempt to become more expansionary. This optimal case
prevails under a regime of uncoordinated monetary policies.













(1) All targets are
achieved
(2) Unemployment
Expansionary (3) Inflation (4) Inflation
While the previous arguments against policy coordination
have pointed out that well-intentioned attempts to raise
national welfare via international policy coordination may
have unintended negative implications for the countries in-
volved, other critics of international policy coordination
stress the public choice arguments; they particularly ques-
tion the assumption that politicians do in fact aim at rais-
ing the welfare of their citizens. Instead it is assumed
that international policy coordination increases the oppor-
tunities of politicians to further their own aims at the ex-
pense of their citizens. By removing the checks and balances
of international currency competition (in the form of an un-
wanted currency depreciation), international policy coordi-
nation allows politicians to form a cartel and collude
against citizens by raising their price (inflation rate) and
lower their output (real balances) (Vaubel 1980, 1983,
1985) .
(1) Case 2, however, is unlikely to occur.- 19 -
IV. Coordination Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates;
Recent Experiences
The world financial system can be characterized as an
arrangement of managed floating between the three big blocks
United States, Japan and Europe. At the same time, the Euro-
pean Monetary System (EMS), effective since 1979, is a
regime of fixed but adjustable rates. What is the experience
with these two regimes with respect to international policy
coordination?
1. Coordination to Avoid Undesired Exchange Rate Changes?
Under fixed exchange rates, economic policies are coordi-
nated by definition (1). If exchange rates are flexible,
countries are relatively independent with respect to mone-
tary and fiscal policy; but there may still be repercussions
from policies abroad which affect domestic targets (see also
section II). This is especially the case when policy-induced
real exchange rate changes are as large and persistent as
they were over the past 15 years. Such changes affect the
relative competitive position of the import sector vis-a-vis
the export sector of the economy as well as competitiveness
among countries. This may lead to temporary or permanent
effects on employment. The most important argument with
respect to coordination seems to be that movements of real
exchange rates immediately affect the inflation rate and can
(1) This is a special form of coordination, namely the syn-
chronization of monetary policy; all countries have to
follow the course pursued by the dominant country. This
implies that inflation rates more or less have to con-
verge. - The proposal of target zones is similar to such
a regime, exchange rates would be more or less fixed.
However, target zones - although propagated by propo-
nents of coordination - would run counter to the idea of
coordination, if, as in the present discussion, it is
suggested that monetary policies should be differenti-
ated between countries. For a critical analysis of tar-
get zones, see Scheide (1986).- 20 -
thus cause a violation of an economic target (1) . An often
quoted example in the coordination-debate is the competitive
revaluation (see section II). It is argued that - if infla-
tion rates are to be reduced - monetary policies should be
coordinated in order to avoid that policies become more
restrictive than originally intended because this would
affect employment negatively. For example, proponents of
coordination usually refer to the Dollar-revaluation between
1980 and 1984: Countries in Western Europe followed a rather
restrictive policy in order to protect their economies from
imported inflation (2) . This may not be the "textbook-case"
of competitive revaluation; but the European complaints
about the US-policy of high interest rates show that the
countries would have preferred a more considerate policy on
the part of the United States. They especially argued again
and again that the United States should relax the stance of
monetary policy (3) .
Another example which is usually quoted to propagate coordi-
nation is the "French experiment" of 1981/82. The French
government tried to fight unemployment by expansionary
monetary and fiscal policy (4). However, this strategy had
to be given up very soon; one of the reasons was the pres-
sure on the French Franc which had to be devalued several
times within the EMS. Now, proponents of coordination argue
that it would not have been necessary to give up this policy
(1) The experience over the past 15 years shows that this
can indeed be a substantial problem; the real exchange
rates between, for example, the US-Dollar, the DMark and
the Japanese Yen have changed by 50 p.c. or more within
a short period of time.
(2) Whether the revaluation of the dollar had a negative
impact on employment is difficult to judge. If negative
impulses resulted from tighter monetary policies, there
were expansionary impulses for export industries.
(3) Ironically, later on the same countries complained that
monetary policy was too loose. In 1986, they tried to
prevent a sharp fall of the dollar by following the
expansionary course in the United States (especially in
Japan and West Germany).
(4) Cp. the critical assessment in Trapp (1982).- 21 -
- which they obviously would support - if other countries
had only followed a similar policy (cf. scenario 1).
Why had the franc to be devalued? If.Jiiarket participants had
viewed the experiment as sound policy the franc would have
surely remained strong; but agents obviously expected more
inflation. If coordination really had implied an expansion-
ary course elsewhere, proponents of coordination often
ignore that such a strategy would have also led to more
inflation. In the case of the unilateral move of France the
inflationary dangers only became obvious faster; but even in
the case of coordination inflation would have gone up, also
in France: firstly, because of higher monetary expansion in
this country, and secondly because of the higher increase of
import prices (1).
2. The EMS: An Example of Successful Coordination?
The EMS is usually viewed as an example of successful co-
ordination. There was much skepticism in the beginning, but
more recently the judgement has become generally posi-
tive (2) . In particular, the proponents point to the sub-
stantial reduction of inflation rates in the member coun-
tries (3) .
Table 3 shows that inflation rates within the EMS went down
substantially: Between 1979 and 1986 the average rate de-
clined by some 6 percentage points, and inflation has been
(1) In the case of no coordination, there will be a devalua-
tion with constant foreign prices; in the case of co-
ordination, the exchange rate is unchanged, but import
prices go up because monetary expansion abroad increases
and leads to an upward movement of prices on all mar-
kets.
(2) Fischer (1987) call the EMS "surprisingly successful".
(3) The Commission of the European Community mentions not
only the reduction but also the convergence of inflation
rates (EC, 1986).- 22 -
very low recently, which is also due to the decline in oil
prices, a common factor for all regions. However, these
figures alone are not so important, they have to be compared
to the performance of an uncoordinated system of (flexible)
exchange rates. In fact, practically all countries have suc-
ceeded in bringing down their inflation rates. The decline
was even larger for the average of OECD-countries outside
the EMS; and the rate there is now as low as in EMS-coun-
tries, while it was higher when the EMS was established. It
is true that the inflation rates in European countries that
are not members of the EMS are relatively high; but they
have also been successful and show the largest decline among
the regions mentioned (1).
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(1) De Grauwe (1985) arrives at a similar result.- 23 -
This should not in any way understate the success of stabi-
lization efforts among EMS-countries. It is remarkable that
such large progress has been made by countries like Italy
and France which had "traditionally" experienced high in-
flation (1) . There is even the possibility that the EMS
contributed to this success in the sense that it enabled
them to follow a course that otherwise might not have been
possible due to political resistance within these coun-
tries (2). But when compared to other regions, the same - or
even a larger - reduction could be achieved in an uncoordi-
nated system. Moreover, several countries with traditionally
high inflation rates have been equally successful as Italy
or France, for example the United Kingdom or Portugal. And
it has also to be taken into account that countries which
had always been more stability-oriented - like, for example,
West Germany - probably needed a longer time to bring down
their inflation to acceptable levels.
Therefore one cannot accept the argument that the EMS shows
how successful coordination is, because it owes its success
to a large extent to the general desire of all countries in
the early eighties to bring down inflation. It is by no
means clear whether the EMS will work in the future. If some
countries once again resort to loose monetary policies in
order to fight unemployment, realignments could only be
avoided if West Germany acted in the same way. Certainly the
current international demands that Germany should reflate
the economy suggest that new conflicts may emerge (3).
(1) Italy's rate in 1980 was higher than 20 p.c, in France
inflation was some 13 p.c.
(2) This is the interpretation of Eggerstedt, Sinn (1987) .
(3) The attitude of some countries is sometimes ambiguous:
On the one hand they expect an advantage by following
the stability-oriented course of the German authorities,
on the other hand they complain about the stance of
policy. Obviously they would prefer stable exchange
rates but a higher rate of inflation.- 24 -
V. International Coordination; Only a New Version of the
Old Locomotive-Theory?
Practically all proponents of coordination use a Keynesian
model. This is true for empirical studies (e.g. Oudiz,
Sachs, 1984) as well as for numerous publications on a less
technical level such as those of the EC-Commission or the
OECD. Typically, it is argued:
(1) High unemployment results from a lack of demand. Eco-
nomic policies have not been expansionary enough in
recent years but have had a deflationary bias. Now the
time has come, the argument goes, to give up overly
restrictive policies (1). A typical Keynesian element is
the use of "output gaps" in those models. Not only is
there much controversy about whether such concepts make
sense at all; but the order of magnitude calculated for
these gaps is far beyond what other institutions esti-
mate. For example, in his baseline-scenario, Oudiz
(1985) estimates the output gap for West Germany to be
some 6 p.c. for 1986. On the other hand, the estimate of
the Sachverstandigenrat (1986, p. 65) for the GNP-poten-
tial implies that the rate of capacity utilization in
1986 was roughly equal to the long-run average of the
period 1963-1985.
(2) It is generally taken for granted that policymakers can
successfully use monetary and fiscal policy to manipu-
late output, employment, and the current account in the
desired way (2) . This totally relies on the assumption
that economic policy can indeed be effective (the
Lucas-critique obviously has not reached those models
(1) The OECD (1987a, p. XI) argues with respect to Germany
and other countries: "Fiscal prudence over recent years
has created scope for a larger budgetary contribution to
domestic demand...".
(2) Typical examples are the publications of the EC as well
as the OECD which imply that surplus countries should
raise, deficit countries should lower domestic demand.- 25 -
yet) . After the experience of the last 15 years it is
dubious whether money illusion can be persistently ex-
ploited as suggested by the models. Further, doubts have
been raised - not only by the revival of the "Ricardian
equivalence" - whether fiscal policy can really have the
effects on employment, interest rates, exchange rates
and so on as the models imply (1).
(3) The optimism with respect to the manipulation of real
variables certainly has to do with the time horizon of
the models; they usually refer to the short run only.
Then a Phillips-curve model is used to estimate the real
effects of changes in monetary policy. Similarly, with
respect to exchange rates, proponents concentrate on the
short-run effects of exchange rate changes. However,
there the analysis should go beyond the initial effect
of overshooting; what happens afterwards? When monetary
expansion decelerates the rate of inflation will fall
rather quickly. But this "success" is not permanent. The
idea of overshooting implies that after some time the
currency will have to devalue again. In this period of
adjustment prices will rise faster than before. This
argument has important consequences for the desirability
of international coordination: If only short-run ex-
change rate changes are included in the utility func-
tion, there is an illusion about the overall effects of
a change in monetary policy. Therefore the time horizon
for evaluating economic policies is not appropriate.
Even proponents of coordination are skeptical and admit
that the short-run effects may not always persist (2).
(1) For a discussion about the meaning and effects of defi-
cits see Brunner (1986).
(2) In the General Discussion (1984, p. 75) of the paper by
Qudiz and Sachs (1984) we find: "Sachs acknowledged that
some effects might be modified or conceivably even re-
versed when looked at beyond the horizon of the
model...". But: "... he did not agree that the short-run
welfare results would be overturned". - With reference
to the Bonn summit of 1978, Home, Masson (1987, p.
29 f.) argue: "... the Bonn measures placed insufficient- 26 -
They also concede that the short-run and long-run utili-
ty functions may well be different, and, most important-
ly, that the short-run seems to fit the policymaker's
time-horizon better: "... Oudiz observed that what argu-
ments were appropriate in the objective function de-
pended on the time period of the analysis. It was pos-
sible to conceive of a long-run analysis and objective
function. But this lay beyond the scope of present quan-
titative models and, possibly, beyond the interest of
the policymakers" (General Discussion, 1984, p. 75).
This certainly sanctions stop-and-go policies and re-
duces economic advisors to the level of "your obedient
servant"! (Vaubel, forthcoming).
(4) The supply side or the role of relative prices is rarely
mentioned in the models; they primarily refer to output
gaps which have to be closed by expansionary demand
policies. If interest rates are considered too high,
proponents of coordination conclude that monetary policy
has to become expansionary; however, high interest rate
may also reflect capital shortage, i.e. a real pheno-
menon which cannot be made to disappear by printing
money. As far as unemployment is concerned, the role of
wages is rarely mentioned. But if unemployment is due to
the fact that real wages are too high or that wages are
not sufficiently differentiated, the comparative advan-
tage of monetary policy rests with fighting inflation
and not unemployment and it should therefore be assigned
to the former target.
These arguments resemble those of the locomotive-approach
which was propagated in the second half of the seventies. In
fact, proponents even stress that the measures taken at that
time can be considered as a good example for today's desired
emphasis on the medium-term consequences of fiscal ex-
pansion...".- 27 -
policies (1). There is one important difference, however, in
that the recent debate focuses more on game-theoretic argu-
ments, and this seems to be an important progress: While in
earlier studies it was stressed that a coordination package
would be beneficial for the group of industrial countries as
a whole, game-theoretic arguments demonstrate that each
country would be better off with respect to its own targets
if it.participates in coordination. So this new approach no
longer relies on altruistic behavior of some countries (cp.
Oudiz, Sachs, 1984, p. 3 f. and Oudiz, forthcoming).
In the seventies, too, proponents of coordinated expansion
argued that inflationary dangers did not exist (e.g.
Solomon, 1978); they argued that the underutilization of
capacities was - in their view - substantial since unemploy-
ment was very high compared to the early seventies. But
after the recommended policies were pursued inflation ac-
celerated. Nevertheless, proponents of coordination still
hold today that the locomotive-experiment was a success;
obviously, they must have a different explanation for the
behavior of inflation, for example, cost-push factors. The
fact is, however, that inflation started to accelerate well
before oil prices were raised. This acceleration can be ex-
plained by the global stance of monetary policy which had
become expansionary already in the course of 1977. The oil
price hike led to a further increase but was not the prime
cause of inflation (2).
(1) Sqe, for example, Cooper (1986) and Bean (1985) .
(2) Inflation started to go up in the United States first;
he,re, monetary policy had become expansionary very
early. Already in the course of 1978, that is before
1the
increase of oil prices, inflation accelerated to some 10
p.c. from 6.5 p.c. and 5.5 p.c. in the previous years.
Other countries followed a little later.- 28 -
VI. What Can Be Expected From Arrangements on an Inter-
national Level?
Present economic problems of industrial countries can hardly
be explained by a lack of opportunities to coordinate. After
all, international organizations have been established ex-
actly for this purpose; and governments and central banks
meet regularly in order to inform each other about policy
intentions and so on. Did the governments not take advantage
of these opportunities, or was coordination simply "bad"?
As far as the economic summits are concerned, the statements
and commitments have in general been empty (1). This is only
to be expected: Summiteers have every reason to promise very
little since their annual meetings make it very easy to
"punish" those among them that do not keep their part of the
bargain. While certain characteristics of the summits - the
small number of participants and their credibility, the
annual repetition of the bargaining game - ensure that those
bargains that are struck are also kept by all parties (2) ,
this very fact militates against detailed and far-reaching
agreements. Another reason why they do not promise much is
that they know that it would be difficult to carry out the
measures "at home".
The lack of precise commitments may also be due to the fact
that there are substantial differences between countries
with respect to their targets and priorities. This is quite
normal, and the flexibility of exchange rates has the im-
portant function of making possible the different policy
changes which may reflect different targets. Although in-
(1) The Bonn summit of 1978 may be called an exception. -
Putnam, Bayne (1985) argue that this emptiness with
respect to precise commitments may have to do with the
fact that events of general political relevance also
played a role in the conferences.
(2) Put differently, the prisoners' dilemma situation is
overcome. Cf. Putnam, Bayne (1984).- 29 -
ternational coordination does not require that all countries
have the same priorities and follow the same strategy it
does need permanent negotiations about policy measures.
While the equilibrium of non-coordination, the Nash-equi-
librium, is stable, an improvement with respect to Nash
requires permanent discussions and negotiations about policy
measures. Such bargaining about the correct course of policy
leads to uncertainty on the markets; there are numerous
examples of public statements by various policymakers on the
"correct" level of the US-Dollar exchange rate or the policy
measures to be taken by other countries which were certainly
confusing the market. One may question whether the bargain-
ing process can in fact find the efficient solution calcu-
lated by diligent economic advisors. If we accept for a
moment the claim that international policy coordination
gives rise to net gains for each country, the bargaining
process has to distribute these net gains among the par-
ticipants. It seems likely that the dispute over a "fair"
distribution of gains interferes with the smooth fine tuning
that is required when managing the world economy - a fact
that even proponents of policy coordination admit (see, for
example, Cooper, 1986).
Coordination can only work and be carried out successfully
over a long period of time if precommitments are credible.
Such commitments have to be reliable just like those given
on a national level. However, the experiences with domestic
policies are not very encouraging: As far as fiscal policy
is concerned, in many cases the promises concerning future
spending cuts or reduction of deficits were not kept. And
monetary targets were missed again and again in many coun-
tries (see, for example, OECD 1987a, p. 15 f.).
Present attitudes towards international agreements do not
make cooperation a likely prospect for the future. This is
one of the reasons why the Louvre-accord of February 1987
failed. More generally, the United States do not take- 30 -
monetary targeting seriously anymore. It may be true that
the various aggregates have undergone severe changes and
that monetary targeting has become more difficult. But the
new mode of policy is certainly also due to the fact that
the US-authorities no longer believe that monetary targeting
makes much sense at all. How else can it be explained that
they urge other countries to do the same and completely
neglect targets (1)? Even if one agreed that international
coordination was desirable, it would be quite unlikely that
successful moves could be expected on the basis of present
controversies (2).
VII. Can the Targets of Economic Policy Also be Achieved
Without Coordination?
It seems that the arguments of proponents of international
coordination are not valid or miss the point:
- The assumptions of the game-theoretic approach with re-
spect to the behavior and the knowledge of policymakers
are unrealistic;
- the selection of targets and instruments does not make
much sense, especially as far as international targets -
exchange rates and current account balances - are con-
cerned;
(1) For example, the Deutsche Bundesbank is criticized not
because it has not hit the target but because it is
trying to return to the target path.
(2) On a recent conference, proponents of coordination
argued that governments had regained a lot of credibili-
ty in recent years because they succeeded in bringing
down inflation. Since then, however, unemployment has
become the most pressing problem, and governments should
now use their accumulated credibility and increase the
money supply one more time - and certainly, for the last
time (!) - to reduce unemployment. They argue: credi-
bility per se is of no use if it is not exploited for
something! This is maybe not the state of the present
debate about coordination; but obviously these eco-
nomists were serious about this proposal.- 31 -
- the focus is almost exclusively on the short run, there-
fore important long-run effects of policy measures - espe-
cially concerning inflation - are not taken into account;
- the relevance of relative prices for growth, employment
and the allocation of resources is neglected;
<- there are hardly any success stories of coordination.
Policy mistakes are likely because of the choice of the time
horizon or the wrong assignment of targets and instruments;
they can be avoided if all countries accept a concept of
economic policy which is oriented at the medium run (1) .
This strategy includes a steady monetary policy to achieve
price level stability. Also, fiscal policy should avoid
discretionary interventions and follow a preannounced path.
Such rules or precommitments are desirable because they make
policies predictable for all economic agents; their expecta-
tions will be stabilized (2) . Given such a course of mone-
tary and fiscal policy, the responsibility for employment
rests with employers and unions.
In this strategy, the roles are assigned in such a way as to
ensure that each instrument has the largest comparative
advantage with respect to achieving the target. Since this
assignment is unambiguous there is no need for international
(1) For this concept, see, for example, Gebert, Scheide
(1980) and Vaubel (1983) . It is designed to lead to
steady growth without inflation, a target shared by all
countries participating in the economic summits.
(2) In other words, the government should not interfere with
the stabilization efforts of economic agents; if they
make mistakes, they will learn quickly - because they
will feel the consequences - and can decide about the
adjustments. This concept also implies that the govern-
ment should refrain from intervention if there are real
shocks; this would only obscure the problem and make an
adjustment more difficult. For example, referring to the
oil price increase Hayek (1980) wrote: "As the price of
gasoline goes up, either you have to buy less gasoline
or buy less of everything else. If you look to the
government for help for the time being, if makes you not
see what your real problem is".- 32 -
coordination. It is also specific with respect to responsi-
bilities and incentives; for example, it would be of no use
if the Deutsche Bundesbank was made responsible for unem-
ployment in other countries. This would not only be a wrong
assignment with respect to the comparative advantage of
policy instruments, it would also create a problem of "moral
hazard": If members of one country can always hold a foreign
country responsible for not having contributed to the
domestic target, the incentive to change their own behavior
would be small.
This strategy can reduce the unpredictability and volatility
of policies substantially, therefore exchange rates will
also be more stable. They nevertheless have to be flexible
to adjust to various circumstances, for example, if. the
countries choose different paths to achieve their targets.
There is room for coordination if it leads to a situation
where
- governments inform each other about their policy inten-
tions;
- the targets are similar even if governments choose a dif-
ferent path to achieve them;
- strategies of open conflict - like beggar-thy-neighbor-
policies or the erection of trade barriers - are excluded.- 33 -
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